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The Balkans.
The Balkan people (instead of a preface) 
“Balkan Peninsula”. “Balkans”. “Balkan people”. “Balkan style”. 
“Balkanism”. “Balkan federation”. “Balkan folklore”. “Balkan eco-
nomic zone”. “Balkan orientalism”. “Balkan ethnic minorities”. “Balkan
identity”. “Balkan identities”. “Balkan nationalism”. “Balkan policies of the
Great Powers”. “Balkan self-(no)confidence”. “Balkan interests”.
“Responsibility of the Balkan Governments”. “Balkan polemics”. “Balkan
evolution”. 
“The Balkans and the World”. “The Balkans and Europe”. “The
Balkans and South-East Europe”. “Balkan alienation”. “The poor (Balkan)
fellowmen”. “The Balkans within”. “The humiliated Balkans”. “The Balkans
and NATO”. “The Balkans and their self-abasement”. “Balkan phobia”.
“Balkan philia”. “Self-isolating Balkans”. “Anti-Balkan conspiracy”. “The
melting pot”. 
“Balkan stereotypes”. “Balkan (self)isolation”. “Balkan reality”.
“Balkan good neighborhood”. “Responsibilities of the Balkan minorities”.
“Balkan cultures”. “A weird Balkan subject”. “Balkan languages”. “Balkan
wars”. “Wars on the Balkans”. “Balkan scepticism”. “... a homogenous
Balkan abstraction”. “Balkan models of development”. “Balkan provincial-
ism”. “Balkan capitals”. “Balkan tradition”. “Pro-Balkan orientation”.
“Balkan morals”. “Prejudices against the Balkans”. “Balkan prejudgment”.
“Disillusioned”. “Stereotypes”. “The different one”. 
“... land of passage for the crusades”... land of history and rivalry
between the ...”. “... outer borders of the West European culture”.
“Responsibility of the Balkan States for...”. “Emotions”. “Fate”.
“Problems”. “Purposefulness”. “Post-colonial history”. 
“The Balkans – facing (the era of) a new beginning”
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 1-2 (3) 2002, pp. 37-58
There are things and situations that assert the definition “anything you
say is true”. But is the Balkan theme among them? One is about to say
not, having in mind the approach and the arguments, negative for their
most, when “Europe”, “the World”, “America”, “the Others” or “the Great
Powers” are interpreting the “Balkan problems”. But the answer would be
rather yes, since closer scrutiny reveals the mosaic-like variety of lands,
economies, policies and standpoints... 
A unique diversity among any of the peoples living on the broadest
Balkan area – this definition is being often used when trying “to think over
the Balkans”. And it could be explained with the centrifugal forces that
had been active on this “riotous” peninsula over the centuries. “But as a
whole, despite the very colorful picture of their beings, they are unified by
something that is still unknown and could be called “the Balkan way”. A
way of developing, of thinking and of life.” 
The very specific conditions of their geographic pattern, history and
ethnic composition have largely contributed to create this combination of
traits determining the character of the people from this part of the world. 
Such a phenomenon wouldn’t be a unique one – it can be seen with-
in many relatively limited cultural communities and in some larger cultural
groups as well. But the specific shape and the dynamics of the historical
processes on the Balkans have led to a very complex mutual intersection
among the peoples living there and their national characteristics. Thus,
when observed more generally, several common traits can be found there,
and some differences too. All those features are supposed to form the
general shape of what is called “the Balkan people”. 
But what is much more important for us, the people who live and
dwell together on this land, is to understand well our common (and com-
munity) features. Our “otherness’ and the “otherness” of the others. The
common way that brings us together. And we are certainly interested in
knowing the others so that we know ourselves better. 
The Balkans. The Balkan people.
“The Otherness” (is not a vice) 
In their history the Balkan peoples have known a number of peri-
ods, when the relations between them have been very brittle and
contradictory in many ways. They have been both “on the same
side of the barricade”, and “on opposite sides” more often. Such
kind of relations have normally led to form some traditional types
of mental ways and attitudes towards the image of “the Other”
and “the Others” on the Balkans and towards the rest of the world
as well. 
The Balkans are the crossroad of many different cultures. The
geopolitical situation of this peninsula opens the door for the pen-
etration and the influence of many external economic, political
and social factors. All these influences are being reflected through
the ways of life and viewpoints of so many different ethnic groups. 
• For example, the southern part of the Balkans, the Aegean
region, had been under the influence of the Levantian (East
Mediterranean) cultural area with its typical mixture between
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the traditional South European and oriental (Arabic) style of
living. 
• The Central part of the Balkans was largely exposed to the influ-
ence of the main trade roads between Europe and the Middle
East. 
• All of the Balkan peoples had more or less been under the sub-
ordination of two global powers – the Byzantine and the
Ottoman Empires. While they were very different from each
other, their character was a mixture between the European
and Middle Eastern cultural traditions. 
• The opposition between Catholicism and the Orthodox religion,
on the one hand, and between Christianity and the Islam, on
the other, had a crucial impact for the formation of certain
types of thinking. 
• During the last two centuries the Great Powers’ cultural expan-
sion on the Balkans has been very mightful. These influences
are nothing but just an expression of the geopolitical interests
that Russia and the West were taking in their relations with the
Ottoman Empire. 
• The influence of the Austrian-Hungarian empire was mainly
over the remote North Western regions of the Balkans1. 
• The Russian influence has always been active over the large
Slavic communities and among some other Christian com-
munities (e.g. the Greeks and the Romanians). 
• The influence of Western Europe was not concentrated at all,
but it first captured Greece, the ancient Greek civilization
being used as a basic factor2. 
Some other minor influences, as well as the unique mixture
and mutual penetration of local and foreign traditions, portray the
contemporary image of this peninsula. 
The general ethnic composition of the Balkan population was
formed circa the 6–7th century AD, when the Slavs had settled
down in the European part of the Byzantine Empire. Around that
time the Balkans were facing the massive invasion of several Turk
and Mongolian tribes, coming from the North East, that occupied
mainly the lower Northern regions along the Danube river. At that
time the most important ethnic components of the Balkan peoples
were already present: Romanised and Hellenised Thracians,
Illyrians and Dacogethians; Greeks, that until the 14–15th centu-
ry felt themselves as deeply integrated in the Byzantine Empire,
commonly named as “Romeys”; Slavs, that were mostly living
within the Bulgarian and Serbian States; some other smaller tribes
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1  This influence would be considered as being “Central European”. 
2  Due to different economic, political and geostrategical reasons, this influence is
nowadays very present and  mightful. 
and peoples-mainly to the North of Central Asia and from the
Arabic world on the Aegean islands (Crete). 
It is very difficult now to find what has remained of the most
ancient inhabitants of the Balkans – the Thracians and the
Illyrians, as they were influenced by the powerful Greek and
Roman civilizations at a rather early stage of their development. 
Since the 3rd century BC the Greeks lived in giant states on
both European and Asian (the Anadol) territory. This is where their
East awareness goes back to (during the centuries this feeling was
changing however). The “all-the world-is-our-home” belief that
the Greeks have, dates back to those times, i.e. the spirit they
have got is a very open and cosmopolitan one. In that way the
Greeks felt cognate and equal to the other nations in the world
and always followed a dynamic and public-spirited way of life. 
The Slavic character is somewhat different. The Slavs are usu-
ally settled and more steadfast people. The world for them is a
“deja-vu”. This is obviously not motivating them to learn more
about it. The Slavs will be also closely attached to a place or
milieu and have a very traditional way of thinking. 
The establishment of closer ties and in the mutual penetration
of the mentioned ethnic elements contributed to the constant co-
habitation on one and the same land and the adoption of
Christianity as a common religion. Some State structures occurred
meanwhile, that during the Middle Age were consequently frag-
mentized. The frequent changes of dominating powers and influ-
ences provoked the emergence of a kind of local (indigenous or
regional) self-consciousness3. These tendencies were reinforced
during the 15th century, when the Balkan nations joined the
Ottoman Empire. 
The osmanisation was the key factor to shape the Balkan peo -
ple’s profile. The inhabitants of this peninsula were submitted to a
giant state for the second time in their history. But while in the
Byzantine Empire all the population was monotheist, the Ottoman
Empire, while imposing quite new social structures and religion,
allowed the formation of a new type of self-consciousness and
self-awareness. 
With imposing the Islam on the Balkans, the road was free for
the massive penetration of different cultural stereotypes from the
East. What is more, the severe survival struggle is still one of the
basic postulates of the Islam. This principle entered into a deep
contradiction with the atmosphere on the Balkans and afterwards
caused several very sharp and painful deviations in the psychoso-
cial profile of the Balkan peoples. The conflict between con-
querors and conquered, between Muslims and Christians provid-
ed for coming into being of new forms of identification and dis-
40
3  This would be showable about the combination of ethnic and territorial self-con-
sciousness. 
sociation. In that way the process of self-enclosing into capsule
and integrating received dimensions that were quite new and
unknown until that time. 
The Islamization practices and the integration of the con-
quered Balkan nations within the “turnover” of Osman Turkey
largely contributed to the emergence of some new features of the
Balkan character, such as the inferiority complex and the isolation
sentiment. During the Renaissance era both features appeared
again in a conspicuous and often grotesque form (as megaloma-
nia for example). 
During the 17–18th centuries the major discrepancies in the
development of the peoples under the Ottoman Empire were
mostly due to their unequal status and involvement in the eco-
nomic life. These discrepancies inevitably infected the attitude
towards each other and their national self-confidence. 
• The Greeks were trading by sea having contacts with the other
European nations. A pronounced (European) interest in their
ancient culture was very present. 
• The Serbs, the Vlasians and the Croats were living on territories
that were rather peripheral to the Empire and closer to its ene-
mies. This contributed to establish mutual contacts and to
speed up their economic development, as well as to enhance
their national self-awareness and promote the national liber-
ation ideology and fight. 
• The Bulgarians, who at that time lived in the internal parts of the
Empire, were put in a much more unfavourable position. The
Turkish economic system had its very roots there and was
much impeding their economic progress. In these regions
many Muslims were settled too. A total islamization of the
indigenous people was in process4. The Bulgarians were the
last to start fighting for their liberation. All this had been
oppressing our national self-confidence. And sometimes had
brought us to actions which were quite ill timed and thought-
less (having fatal consequences too). 
The advantages that Greece had with the earlier development
of its national liberation ideology, nourish the superiority feeling of
the Greeks and their megalomania. Since the beginning of the
19th century, much more than during the 15th, the Greeks con-
sider themselves closer to their ancient predecessors. And of
course much more European than under the Byzantine Empire. 
At that time Serbia had a powerful ally – the Austrian-
Hungarian State. Nonetheless Serbia never rejected the Russian
support for the Slavs brought into bondage. 
41
4  The local population’s islamization practices included a wide range of instruments –
economic, political and social. 
The Vlassian State, which was rejoicing at the highest level of
independence, was also compelled to make its choice among the
Great Powers. 
In that way the newly liberated Balkan nations in the 19th cen-
tury were compelled to bind themselves to a new Patron. This, of
course, was very sad for their national self-reliance. The situation
favored the further development of some characteristic spirits that
had first arisen under slavery, such as self-seeking, power strife,
servility and treachery proneness. After the Liberation these fea-
tures were characteristic of all the Balkan peoples, namely an
antithesis of heroism, self-devotion and the patriotic blast of the
national liberation movement. 
This was also the time when the Balkan nations became
aware of their economic, social and cultural backwardness – a
source of bad inferiority complex and a challenge to recover. 
That phenomenon left a deep imprint on the Balkan charac-
ter. The Medieval “micro-society” was over5. The new societies
were developing and establishing contacts very dynamically.
Suddenly the world became much larger and more attractive (but
somewhat frightful). The broadening of the horizons stirred up the
curiosity and it was enthusiastic (but caused some scepticism too).
“The Balkan spirit” was permeated with specific meaning (or
value) in everything that was coming in from “the Great World”. 
After the Liberation era the Balkan peoples were as a rule
prone to reject anything, bringing back to them the shadow of the
ex-conqueror and being therefore thought as something retro-
grade and frustrating. The need to defend the hurt self-confidence
urged for new virtues that were specific and strongly national,
such as industriousness, trading flair, hospitality, amusement skills,
etc. These were indeed brought to the fore since the times of slav-
ery. 
An interesting phenomenon was about to happen – a nation
could be proud with some qualities that the other Balkan peoples
would see as negative ones. And vice versa. This was mostly true
for some features and customs (negative in their idea), associated
with the Turkish (or oriental) mentality. For example the passive
approach towards the environment, the less active behaviour are
still being commonly described as “orientalism”, i.e. to move
slowly, “just mucking about all the time6”. 
Such kind of passive approach towards the real things of life
is often going “hand-in-hand” with a very vivid tendency to politi-
cise on every occasion. This phenomenon can be interpreted at
different levels. But it would virtually mean to avoid working, to
postpone the real solution of practical problems by feeling the
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5  This is the conservative patriarchal family with its traditional customs and values. 
6  When wishing to express this on a positive way, one is talking about “the thabyet” –
something is done “thabyet- like”, i.e. in a slow and calm way, just like a ritual. 
urge to take part in political affairs (“this is a job too”) with the
only intention to reach “quick profits”. Another, more life-bound
sense of it would be the desire to speak more about things, than
make real efforts to cope with them. This social-psychological type
can be seen with all of the Balkan peoples. 
The contradictory atmosphere of the post-liberation develop-
ment of the Balkan countries provoked the occurrence of some
other phenomena, as the self-admiration and the aggressive
chauvinism. But those were only attempts to enhance their own
self-confidence and self-respect, resulting in some ridiculous ways
and often just contrary to the desired ones. 
All attempts to portray the Balkan character would have to
tackle a great number of limitations. Even when finally set, the
puzzle will continue to look fragmentary-like, rather than fully
completed. To define some common characteristics and compo-
nents would be a better performance, than just try to describe “the
general profile of the Balkan people”. 
To better learn a foreign language, one is to know not only
the rules, but (all) the exceptions to them as well. But sometimes
the exceptions are so many that they (often) make the rules sense-
less. 
Turkey 
Turkey7 is a Republic. The Great National Assembly (the Medjlis),
the President of the Republic, the Government and the
Constitution Court are the major institutions in this country. 
The population of Turkey is circa 61 million. (1994). 98% are
Muslims. More than 25 other ethnic groups and communities live
in the country, in addition to the Turks8 (Kurds, Arabs, Armenians,
Lazians, Jews, Bulgarians). The largest among them is the Kurdish
minority (around 12.6% of the total population). 
At present the Bulgarians in Turkey are about 500–800 peo-
ple only. They are mostly living in Istanbul9. 
The problem for the Bulgarian expatriates to Turkey is far
more different. During the 1878–1912 period some 350 000
Muslims left Bulgaria to settle down in Turkey; in the period
1913–1934 they were 10–20 000 per year; during the WW 2
(1940–1944) – circa 15 000; in 1950–1951 – more than 150
000 people; in 1968 – over 70 000; in 1989 – more than 360
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7  The surface area of Turkey is 814 578 sq. km. 790 200 of them are reaching the
Asia and only 24 378 are in  Europe. Turkey’s neighbours are the CIS, Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Greece and Bulgaria. 
8  Turkey claims itself being a mono-national state. 
9  The official data are for 33 000 Bulgarian speaking people in 1935; in 1955 they
were less than 21 000; the  statistics for the year 1965 don’t consider such a group
anymore. 
000 (some of them came back later); during the period
1990–1996 – some 30–60 000 people left the country each year.
The largest Bulgarian colonies are in Edirne, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa,
Ankara, Konya, etc. 
The economic potential of Turkey is very substantial and fast
developing. The country has been quickly industrialising. The
national income per capita was USD 2 605 in 1999. Large
investments are being made in agriculture, tourism and in other
industrial sectors such as mining and public services. To stimulate
the foreign investments Turkey is promoting free economic zones. 
The main foreign trade partners of Turkey are the EU coun-
tries, the US, Switzerland, Austria and Japan. Turkey’s balance of
trade with these countries is unfavourable. At the same time the
exports for the region countries (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the
Emirates) are growing. Intense economic ties are being estab-
lished with the CIS countries and China. 
Great impact over the Turkish economy and over the
Europeization of the country has been realised by the “gastarbeit-
ers”. After the WW2 many Turks left their country and headed for
Western Europe, trying to earn their living. “In the beginning treat-
ed unequally, living in the ghettoes, not educated in their mother
tongue, they have consequently won their own positions, built their
own subculture to become at the end not only tolerated, but
largely sought as manpower. This is due to the fact that they have
always been so well “entrenched” by the Islam to respect labour
and to be modest in life, as well as to strictly abide by the hierar-
chy and to isolate themselves in small uniform communities.
Mostly born in Germany from the genuine Turkish “gastarbeiters”,
their second generation already feels completely integrated in the
European society. They have a local citizenship and often are
highly educated; a new circle of intellectuals of Turkish descent is
about to appear, but European by nature”. The contacts of the
“gastarbeiters” with their Turkish relatives add to the country’s
economic prosperity. 
The traditions and the customs of the Turks are mainly based
on their religion. “The ritual of the washing up, the regular
prayers, keeping the fast, the rejection of pork meat and alcohol
have become an integral part of the Turkish stereotype. They may
not be active believers, but the “home made” Islam is a very
steadfast one and the modern man is also supposed to bear the
traits inherited from the Islamic tradition”. 
• Cleanliness (the ritual of the cleaning) is a cult. 
• As tradition demands, believers are preaching to Allah five times
a day. 
• The Muslims keep fast for 30 days during the ninth month of the
Islamic calendar (the Ramazan). 
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• The Kurban Bayram is the major Muslim holiday (the Day of the
Sacrifice). 
• The Muslim religion forbids pork meat and alcohol. 
• The circumcision of the boys (the sunnet). This goes back to the
old pagan times and is mainly associated with the inaugura-
tion of the boys in fully matured men. This is one of the
biggest family holidays in Turkey. 
• The Law forbids polygamy itself, while the Islam is permissive of
the polygamous life in general. Nevertheless, there exist some
polygamy cases (mainly among the wealthy Muslim families in
the rural regions). 
The modern times with their dynamics have inevitably brought
the European standards and culture to the large Turkish territory.
It can be seen everywhere but mostly in the major cities, in the
external look of the buildings, in the shops, in the style of dress-
ing, in the day-to-day life, etc. It exists at the same time together
with the marks of the traditional Islamic culture (more often in the
villages and in the small towns of the East and South East regions). 
The Turkish cuisine is well known with the abundance of
choice of seafood (especially in the coastal areas). Included in the
menu predominantly are the shish kebab and the other kinds of
roast meat (among them the dunner kebab is most popular –
slices of meat, put on a vertically rotated pick). Rice is something
typical for the Turkish cuisine, served as a garnish or with the main
dish (the pilaf for example). Rice is the ingredient in some sweet
dishes too. Other typical meals are the filled peppers, the sarmi
and the patladjans, as well as many kinds f soups (the patcha, the
tripe soup, the kurban, etc.), the mezes, the pasta and the sweets,
the dried fruits and the nuts… Coffee and tea are favourite too. 
The Turks in Bulgaria 
“The vast majority of the Bulgarians consider now the Turks as
being either the legacy of a distant and tragic past or today’s
compatriots from an ethnic religious minority that has often been
a source of troubles and political tension10”. 
The religion. “. . . the Islam on the Balkans and particularly in
Bulgaria has always been a syncretic one, different from the other
pure forms of this school of thought. Adapting itself to the
Bulgarian soil, the Islam has bit by bit created some specific reli-
gious forms, making it to be not too hostile and alien to the local
Christian people”. “The Turks in Bulgaria” bear a century-old cul-
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10  Contemporary some 1 200 000 Muslims (Turks, Bulgarian Muslims and gypsies)
are living in Bulgaria. The very  last data shows them to be 800 000. They are most-
ly Sunnis from the Khanifath’s fraction and some 84 000 people are  Muslim-Shiites
– so called “Kazalbashians”. 
tural tradition. They consider themselves as being mostly
“European Muslims” and are alien to every form of religious
fanaticism”. 
As the Muslim faith prescribes, the Turks in Bulgaria are abid-
ing by the strict traditions, customs and day-to-day rituals11. 
“The Turkish community has a very clear and uniform under-
standing about its ethnic origin and religious integrity . . . If a dif-
ferent identificational approach still exists . . . it refers to the civil
(patriotic) identity12”. 
Those are people basically calm and somewhat sluggish.
They are a “yavash” (inactive, slow) people. Restlessness is not
inherent characteristic of theirs. This could be due mostly to the
closed character of their ethnic societies, which keeps unchanged
their traditional style of living. 
At the same time they are hospitable and love having guests.
On such occasions they will show an explicit warmness and cor-
diality. When seated around a table they love eating, drinking or
just chatting. 
They are very hard working and greatly respect their work.
They will be always grateful if their labour is appreciated. 
The Turks in Bulgaria are strongly bound to and very much
love their families. They will enjoy talking about the troubles and
problems their families have. They will be glad to speak about
their children. They love kids and have two, three or more children
as a rule. The higher rates of birth are certainly due to some
backward living standard. 
The Turks in Bulgaria have in general a strong feeling for fam-
ily affiliation. This is most characteristic in the small villages.
Everyone will see when a family member is missing. Family rela-
tions and relatives are there very close. Among the members of
the different families there is a great mutual respect. Such feelings
might be sometimes a motivation for a vendetta. 
In their lifestyle the Turks in Bulgaria are mostly conservative.
Some of them are still less educated. This is most typical of the
women, who as a rule must be primarily bound to set up home
(women will get married early). After they can feel better and com-
fortably, as tradition prescribes. 
Those people have a strong sense of honour and dignity. The
friendship for them is very important, but they will prefer to keep
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11  Such as “the ritual of the washing up, the regular priests, the fasts, the refusal from
pork meat and alcohol, etc.”;  the namaz (the priest); the fasts (for 30 days during
the ninth month of the Islamic calendar); the Sacrifice Day, which is  a major Muslim
holiday (the Kurban Bayram); the circumcision of the boys (the sunnet); the special
marital and burial  rituals and so forth. 
12  Some of the people believe Turkey is their genuine Motherland and define their atti-
tude towards Bulgaria as a  temporary land of residence. There are others that
accept Bulgaria as their ancient native land, Turkey being considered  as an alter-
native Patria. 
their close contacts and bosom friends inside their own communi-
ty. 
In their relationships they are sensitive and sentimental and
could become very touchy to a hostile tone or to an arrogant or
rude attitude. 
What are the Greeks like? 
The Greeks in Bulgaria 
Just like every other people from the South and by the Sea, the
Greeks have a flaming and jovial temper. But they will be quick-
tempered and very easily burst into anger. They are self-respect-
ing. 
The Greeks are prone to part quickly with the old-fashioned
ideas, leaving the door open for the new coming things. They are
alien to conservatism, but will respect the traditional values of their
families. There are some among them that still believe a humilia-
tion can be “washed” by blood only. 
The Greeks enjoy talking about politics and are very opinion-
ated thereof. This quality of theirs is as popular as their firm belief
that every Greek was born to be a trader. 
Career and glory seekers. Everyone is fighting for better posi-
tions within their own political party. Party leaders look for minis-
terial seats every time. Being a Minister for just a day, one will be
addressed to as “Mister Minister” until the end of their days13. 
They hanker after the quick rise in the job hierarchy. They love
feeling “important” and being respected more than their social
status really deserves14. They will not stay indifferent towards the
praises towards them, their families and relatives. 
In general the Greeks know the ancient Hellenic culture and
will never miss a chance to show their knowledge about15. They
welcome every interest that one might have in their own history.
But they get angry, if one’s ideas are better than their own. 
They have a national feeling that is well developed and could
even turn into chauvinism sometimes. This is mostly valid for the
Athenians – they claim Athens is the most beautiful city in the
world. 
They can rarely be persuaded. 
The Greeks are outgoing. They are very easy to make contact
with and only a couple of days later they will come to you calling
you “an old friend of mine” in the most familiar way. But they
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13  This is typical for the other Mediterranean countries also (Spain, France, Italy). It
goes back to the Middle ages,  when these countries had a developed nobility hier-
archy with the relevant traditions that are still alive. 
14  Whoever will dislike that? “Just call me “Mr.” to make me happy”. 
15  This knowledge being not very thorough. 
know what the price of friendship is. If a Greek really trusts a
friend, he would be ready to do anything for him. 
The “peacock complex” is something in their blood – they feel
quite normal when bragging about their “close” acquaintances
and high connections, Ministers, MPs or prominent intellectuals.
Very often nothing is behind such phony phrases. 
The Greeks can easily promise something and just forget
about on the next day. They will after that only try to justify the
things promised and undone. They are more honest in their busi-
ness contacts. 
They are great money-lovers. The frequent econo-mic crash-
es made them disillusioned with their own national currency. That
is why they always try to invest their savings in gold. They can
make their bills very well and are very pragmatic in their day-to-
day expenses. 
Corruption is omnipresent, with all walks of life in this country
– everybody is taking bribes or “bakshish”. 
When endangered, they react emotionally, rather than ration-
ally. 
Very big attention is being paid to one’s appearance. Greek
women would enjoy wearing smart, but stuffy clothes. Their hous-
es are tastefully furnished and clean, but with some commonness
too. 
Getting married in Greece is a serious problem. The dot is
very popular and even obligatory in some places, as being a sign
of decency and nobleness. In some cases the young girls are
doomed to stay unmarried or get married older because of failure
to provide the dot demanded. This would be the reason why there
are betrothals that last for years there. Many unequal (difference
of age) marriages could be seen there16. 
In such cases many of them tend to “transform” the girls’ dot
in good education studies, preferably abroad. 
The mother will often be the strongest arm of the family – she
deals presumably with the problems and is the policy maker of the
family. Nevertheless, the “head” of it is formally the man. 
There is not a large Greek community in Bulgaria at present.
The December 1992 census data show some 8 000 people stat-
ing Greek as their mother tongue. In Bulgaria “the Greeks were
and still are predominantly urban people, mainly oriented to busi-
ness and mediation activities”. Today there are still regions in
Bulgaria, where the Greek communities and elites “unbeatably
hold the dominating position, which only develops in the
Bulgarian Renaissance society the reaction to reject anything that
until recently was called “the Greek yoke”. 
48
16  The traditional material aspects of the marriage are considered as a main reason
for that. 
In their history the Bulgarians often associated the word
“Greek” with the word “salesman” or “savant, literate”. But for
some of the contemporary Bulgarians the word “Greek” is asso-
ciated with “Byzantine”, synonym for perfidy and treacherousness. 
The Bulgarians 
Shaping the social-psychological characteristics of the genuine
Bulgarian is a tough job. If accomp-lished correctly, one will have
to take into consideration the specific interpretations of the differ-
ent history periods. 
Attempts to draw the Bulgarian’s profile are often supposed to
point out the specific periods of the Bulgarian history. One of the
most often used categories thereto is “before the Ottoman domi-
nation and after that”. The period “after that” still remains incom-
pletely surveyed. Especially when talking about the time after the
year 1944. 
In the period before the Ottoman invasion there had been
times of great upsurge in the country’s development, time of high-
est national spirits and social impulses. This period was marked
with many brilliant examples of political boldness and statecraft.
Most of these e patterns of the national character degraded or
vanished forever after the country fell under the Ottoman domi-
nation. Many new negative traits appeared instead that are still
alive in the Bulgarian character. However, there’s one thing that
was most typical of the whole history of our people – the great
amount of troubles and the tough will of the Bulgarians to fight
and overcome them. 
Among the qualities, acquired during the second major peri-
od of our history, there could be asserted features as the lack of
historical audacity and courage. During those times fear filled the
Bulgarian national character. The Bulgarian policies were pene-
trated by a kind of acquiescing sentiment that was in no way the
result of some racial or genetic malformation, but was molded as
a sustainable national quality by the historical fate, by the blood
itself, the pain and the lack of other historical chances. 
By strange caprice of history, it was namely the inferiority com-
plex and the adaptive reactions which saved the Bulgarians from
the total extermination and secured their long lasting historical
presence on the Balkans. These features are a kind of specific and
relevant reaction of every single individual and of the social com-
munities as well. The survival of our people depended on their
capacity to comply with the realities of life and to adequately face
the objective processes. 
The survival and the self-conservation go well together with
the industriousness, which is another important trait of the
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The “lack of chances in history” has largely contributed to the
appearance of other specific qualities of the Bulgarian character
as nihilism and its queer antithesis – megalomania. Both happen
to be the roots of the “philia” and the “phobia” that put their mark
on large periods of the Bulgarian political history. 
The Bulgarian national nihilism appears to be the legacy of
the grave historical hardships and tragedies lived by our people,
of the painful slavery, of the missed chances to recover the losses.
The megalomania is rooted in our history, being mostly bound to
the bright hope for the new Renaissance era of the Bulgarian exis-
tence and expectations. Nihilism has a persistent and stable place
in our souls, while megalomania breaks out sometimes as a brief
and spontaneous reaction to different negative social-psycholog-
ical factors. 
A deep imprint on the psychology of the Bulgarians was made
by the collision between the tradition and the modern trends. The
traditions had always been an expression of the century-old devel-
oped patriarchal conservatism, based mostly on the specific con-
ditions of life. The new trends of the world development, coming
in from the West in the late 19th and during the first years of the
20th century, led to the “Bulgarization” of many new ideas and
achievements, when interpreted through the Bulgarian traditional
ways. These were times when the Bulgarians were trying to join the
European progress and prosperity. They were “copying” and imi-
tating, but this “copying” left sustainable marks in their character.
One of them is that the Bulgarians, are still lagging behind. For
that reason the lack of national self-reliance was very noticeable
at many moments of our history. But once again, just like out of
spite, our predecessors proved themselves as widely open to the
forthcoming future. Because of that we are always eager to learn
and understand what other people’s achievements are. 
The favourable geographical position of the Bulgarian lands
and their fertility are often considered as impeding factors to the
industrial development of the country. Thus the economic under-
deve-lopment could be explained as mostly due to the delayed
awareness of “the modern times’ sign”, as well as to the lack of
serious historical experience. 
Tracing the social class dissociation could help to further
explain the social-psychological characteristics of the different
class representatives. For example, the moral image of the capi-
talist is characterised as “emptied from every humaneness”. It
turned just into “a dry book keeper, an emanation of pure greed”.
Egoism became a dominating moral feature, still present in the
psychology of the Bulgarians. 
On the other hand, the Bulgarians are compassionate and
always ready to help17. This nourished the responsiveness, which
17  Someone said it was shown when many Bulgarians took part in the liberation fights
of the other peoples  (”internationalism”). 
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is too typical for the Bulgarian character (whilst being sometimes
spoiled by the influence of some specific events). 
Are the Bulgarians hospitable? The traditional studies say
rather YES. This quality is being allegedly valid until now. It could
be assessed as one of the signs of compassion and readiness to
help. 
The privations, insufficiency and poverty made the Bulgarians
very thrifty ones. This was mostly due to their traditional life styles
and morality. In some cases this quality could degrade to a parsi-
mony. 
The Bulgarians were often compelled to economize on their
food. This has made them possessive and miserly-like to some
extent. But they were brought to that by the long years of hard
working and poverty and they suffered their own little wealth. This
evoked (in several historical periods) a phenomenon when a sin-
gle human personality was likely to represent one separate eco-
nomic and moral unit. 
This would be the only underlying reason for the individualism
of the Bulgarians. As a moral phenomenon it occurs every time,
when a single unit determines the course of the social develop-
ment, only driven by its private interests. 
Individualism as a moral feature has been largely comment-
ed in the Bulgarian social-psychological studies. But its evaluation
and interpretations are not uniform. The differences appeared first
with disputing the thesis (“Are in fact the Bulgarians individual-
ists?” – by enumerating different group forms of social behaviour
and of mutual aid), through defining different “positive” and “neg-
ative” effects (e.g. “Good men are individualists” versus “How
come that we are so good, but we can never walk all together . .
. just look at the Germans. . .”) to provide at the end some advice
to the current educational practices. 
It is being also pointed out that under the specific conditions
of history individualism can lead to complacency, strife for
acknowledgement and lust for glory as well. But it would also
awake the ingenuity and the energy (too typical for the Bulgarian
spirit!?). 
Romania 
Romania18 is a Republic. The country is being administratively
divided into 41 districts (Bucharest inclusive). There are 262 cities.
Major centers are Bucharest, Konstanza, Yash, Timishoara, Galaz,
Breshov, Kluj Napoka, Kraijova, etc. 
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18  Surface area – 238 391 sq. m. Borders: East – Republic of Moldavia, the Ukraine,
the Black Sea; West – Hungary;  South West – Yugoslavia; South – Bulgaria; North
– the Ukraine. 
According to the 1992 census data, Romania has 22 760
449 inhabitants. The urban population is 2 million bigger than the
rural one. The ethnic composition is as follows: Romanians –
more than 89%; Hungarians – over 7%; over 1.5% gypsies;
1.5–2% – other (among them Bulgarians). 
The active workers in the country are circa 10 m. Among them
3.5 m are agricultural and around 3 m are industrial workers19. 
The most effective branches of the economy are the industry
(mainly oil and car industries (and the agriculture (field farming
and cattle breeding). Great is the country’s potential to develop
tourism. 
Orthodox faith is the mostly spread religion in Romania.
According to the 1992 census data, circa 87% of the Romanians
claimed themselves as Orthodox, 6% as Catholics and less than
4% as adepts of other religions. 
The customs and beliefs of the Romanians are a mixture
between the archaic traditions, some Latin inherited traits and
several later acquired mainly Slavic components. 
Among the calendar customs noteworthy are the following: 
• winter holidays December 24 till January 7 – Christmas, the
New Year, the ancient Plough’s Day (a kind of local Christmas
feast); some other Christmas festivities, similar to these in
Bulgaria (the Kukers parade, etc.), the Annunciation Day, etc.; 
• spring customs – St. Triphon’s Day, St. Kharalam-pius’ Day, the
Day of the Vlassians20; the Martenitza’s buckling (in Romania
the legends are for Grand Mother Dokya and rarely for
Grand Mother Martha); the Ploughsman Day – related to the
beginning of farming; St. George’s Day, the Flowers Day, the
Easter, the Little Horse’s Day or the “kalushari”; 
• summer and autumn customs are mostly related to the agricul-
tural work-these are ritual practices to protect the crops (from
drought), such as the “Parapuda”, the “Caloianul21”; very
important are the customs related to the harvest, as the
“Dragaica” and the “Cunina” (the wreath). 
Practiced are also several family customs, mostly related to
birth, marriage and death. 
The Romanians are warm and hospitable people, which is
basic in their lives. “A great custom I found there, the greatest I
saw in all countries I have ever been. The people at this place. . .
like elsewhere in the country, are accustomed to grant free of
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19  More than 550 000 people are employed in the construction industry; same num-
ber in the trade industry; circa half  a million in the transports; 432 000 in the edu-
cation system; 308 000 in the public health system and so forth. 
20  This type of holidays is different by nature and ritual practices from its Bulgarian
homologues. 
21  This type of holidays is different by nature and ritual practices from its Bulgarian
homologues. 
charge food and bed to all strangers”. “In the whole world there
are no men that are more hospitable”. 
For a Romanian being hospitable means to meet their guests
with the best they ever have to eat and drink. The best of their
bread and wine, the always present “mamaliga” (just like our
“katchamak”), known all over the country, as well as everything
delicious, kept in the house for a special occasion. 
Albania. The Albanians 
Albania has a relatively small territory – 28 748 sq. km. Its bor-
ders’ length is only 720 km. The Adriatic and the Ionic Sea,
Greece, Serbia and Montenegro are surrounding the country. 
The Albanians are of Indian-European type and wouldn’t be
distinguished among the other Europeans, if dressed accordingly. 
The economy. Albania has a comparatively backward econo-
my, from the industrial point of view. The lowest level of the eco-
nomic development and the very conservative spirit of the
Albanians set the pattern for their22 standard of living, which is a
poor one. 
The family. The family model is mainly determined by the trib-
al, ethnic and religious affiliation. 
The language. The Albanian language belongs to the Indian-
European group, but has no relation to any other European lan-
guage and is relatively independent. It contains many foreign
words and expressions, mainly from Italian and Turkish origin. Two
main dialects are predominant in the spoken language – the gega
and the toska. The gega is more popular and has been acknowl-
edged as the official language at a national level, due to the fact
that this dialect was Enver Hodja’s mother tongue. 
The religions. Three main cults are mostly spread in this coun-
try – Islam, the Orthodox Christian religion and Catholicism.
Muslims are circa 60% of the population, while 30% are
Orthodox and 10% are Catholics. Orthodox are mostly the mem-
bers of some Greek, Bulgarian and “Macedonian” minorities from
Southern Albania. Should it be noted here that in spite of the clos-
est neighbourhood and powerful influence of Italy, Catholicism is
relatively less popular than the other religions. The Albanians are
still being hard believers, despite the suppression of the religious
cults under the communist regime. 
The character. The genuine Albanian is basically reticent and
conservative. He is reserved towards foreigners and will fear being
cheated. He is definitely suspicious, which is based on some his-
torical reasons. 
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22  These customs have their analogy in Bulgaria too, while the “Parapuda” is popu-
lar on all the whole peninsula. 
Hospitality is one of the most typical traits of the Albanian
national character. Even the most hated enemies would be dear-
est guests while at home, but might be stabbed in the back, right
after they leave. The Albanians as a rule are very vindictive and
would often act on a “eye-for-eye” basis. 
But they may also be driven by another idea – “faith-for-faith”.
Their trust being once won, they will stay friends forever. 
The Albanians have a very strong national feeling, which is
historically rooted in the century – old fight to safeguard their
community. 
Ethnic societies and their future 
If looking back at the multi-coloured ethnic picture of the Balkan
nations, a very “curious” phenomenon appears – in every one of
them there are people, determining themselves as different from
the prevalent ethnic population; at the same time, they are all cit-
izens of one and the same country. In other words, the ethnic
minorities are present in every Balkan country23. 
And here we come across another feature that is a very spe-
cial and important one – the ethnic minorities of the Balkan coun-
tries are much more different from the rest of the world. In the
Balkans’ case the ethnic minorities live next to countries, where
their own ethnic ancestors have already accomplished their
national identity, besides the ethnic one. This fact is very important
and predestines the striving of the ethnic communities that are a
“majority” (in the neighbouring country), to urge their “ethnic
brothers”, who are a “minority” (in the next country) towards the
achievement of their national identity too. 
A thesis could be further developed, arguing that the behav-
iour of the Balkan ethnic communities is mostly determined by
three major psychological and historical general phenomena,
named as “complexes”. 
• “The survival complex”. The reasons for its existence can be
found in the history of the Balkan nations and in their geo-
graphical situation as well, which has always been a crossing
point for so many and different ethnic minorities. It first
appeared as a complex for physical survival. Later, when the
ethnic self-awareness was in place already, it became a com-
plex for ethnical and cultural survival too. This complex is a
psychological and constant prerequisite for the ethnical defi-
ance. On the Balkans “we-vs- them” is thought of rather as a
confrontation than as a difference. 
• “The retrospection complex”. It is also rooted in the historical
development and as to its formation it is closely tied to the sur-
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23  Should it be conventional or not. 
vival complex (physical and ethnical). It reflects the commit-
ment to the past, which is too typical of the Balkan ethnic
communities, the past being at the same time a source and
guidebook to the future. The retrospection complex appears
in two different and controversial ways. On the one hand,
sought in the past will be both arguments for the exclusiveness
of a given ethnic element and positive examples that could be
helpful to solve some present-day problems. In this sense, the
past predetermines the present and the future. On the other
hand, this sentiment may have more hidden and oppressive-
like character and may appear mainly as inferiority complex.
Finally the retrospection complex with its both sides could eas-
ily become one more precondition for the ethnic confronta-
tion among the Balkan peoples. 
• “The liberty complex” . The liberty complex is being expressed by
two main trends on the Balkans. The first of them is the incli-
nation towards authoritarian models of political government,
examples of which can be found in all of the Balkan States.
The second trend concerns the comparative approach
towards the other non-Balkan ethnic communities, which
makes the so-called “European syndrome”. It goes back to
the Balkans’ Renaissance Age and to the time after the disso-
lution of the Turkish Empire. The “European syndrome” is still
being active by way of seeking the patronage of Europe when
trying to solve the problems, peculiar to every single Balkan
State. 
Which are the main strategies, followed by the Balkan politi-
cians? According the above mentioned author, these political
strategies could be defined as mostly guided by three general
principles: 
• The political cooperation principle. This principle is a basic one
for every political strategy, but what is noteworthy here is the
way it is being revealed on the Balkans, where “the ethnic ele-
ment” is fundamental. It had several times resulted in the for-
mation of temporary political unions between countries that
have no ethnic controversies and because of that could feel
jeopardized by third countries. This would ostensibly lead to
the creation of other reciprocal unions to neutralize (or bal-
ance) the influence of the first ones. 
• The “belligerent” patriotism principle. Patriotism normally makes
an integral part to every political strategy. But the “ethnic ele-
ment”, as well as the influence of the ethnic-psychological
complexes, widely determine its specific manifestation in the
Balkans. An important pattern of the “belligerent” patriotism
will be ignoring some own ethnic problems and raising ethnic
claims against the neighbouring countries instead. It normal-55
ly paves the way for chauvinism and nationalism and thus
making it a routine political practice is near at hand. Sadly
enough, this principle still exists in the political guidelines of
most (if not of all) of the Balkan countries. 
• The Great protectors’ principle. It showed first after the libera-
tion from the Turkish yoke and was mainly based on the
assumption that by a support from outwards there could be
guaranteed not only the internal ethnic stability, but also some
“ethnical” claims concerning the other countries could be put
forward. Before and during the WW1, the Balkan nations
were divided between the two global political pacts. During
the post-war period, when the boundaries were reset on the
Balkans, the ethnic problems of the winning countries were
settled to the detriment of the losers, which obviously created
the prerequisites for the Balkan countries to be split off for the
second time during the WW2. After the dissolution of the
communist system this principle received some new dimen-
sions by reinforcing the influence of the “European syn-
drome”. 
For many non-Balkan politicians, scientists or analysts, the
existence of several different “pacts”, “axes”, “arcs” and so on
(among the Balkan countries), would be a good way to explain
the Balkan problems, as well as an effective remedy to cure them.
On the grounds of that many different theories, viewpoints and
concepts are being developed. But whilst providing some more or
less plausible explanation thereof, no firm solution can be found
so that it can be positive enough. As the whole Balkan history
shows, to set the Balkan countries against each other could only
provoke respectively the emergence of new groups or alliances to
fight and would just deepen the conflicts, instead of settling them.
In the Balkans the alliances can be anything but temporary. The
allies of today are tomorrow’s enemies, as it has always been. 
As a rule, the Great Powers can’t understand what the Balkan
problems really are. Only driven by their own selfish interests, they
have often imposed on the Balkans many political concepts and
schemes that have repeatedly renewed and further reproduced the
existing conflicts. 
These conflicts have been making their impact on Western
Europe and US too, their interests being also provoked in most of
the cases. While they both are presumed interested in the Balkan
stability, their actions bear an ostensibly different “accent”: 
• For Western Europe these are Slovenia and Croatia that are
Catholic; 
• For the US this is the South Balkans’ line
(Tirana–Skopje–Sofia–Ankara). 
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The European countries show an explicit interest to stay apart
from the Balkans and are most reluctant to admit that the Balkan
people could be genuinely European. For the West Europeans
Europe ends as a rule where Western Christianity ends (as it is for
most of the Europeans or for the Western researchers as a whole).
In the most cheerless predictions the EU’s enlargement would also
come to its end right at the moment, when the outer boundaries
of the Western civilization are reached. Most of the Balkan peo-
ples have a vision for their future, mostly related to Europe. But we
are not ready for that. And Europe is not ready to let us in. 
It might be ironic by history that the Balkan countries always
turn to the West, when looking for an arbiter in their problem solv-
ing efforts. But due to many reasons, objective and prejudicial at
the same time, this couldn’t be a place, where help would come
from. This might become ever clearer, when one will have to lis-
ten to the condescending and mentor-like tone the Great Powers
use towards the Balkans, but we are the only ones to blame. 
One last known tendency of the Western policies is taking into
consideration the fact there would not be any chance to impose
an overall democracy model, whatever it might be. Just like after
the crash of communism, when researchers understood that it was
impossible to promote a social structure model, valid for every-
one. In the light of this, all attempts to impose some “common
ethnic models”, as it is the case with the European Minorities
Protection Convention, could be assessed as purely ungrounded. 
The right settlement into shape of the Balkan problems will
become only possible, when all Balkan countries join their own
efforts thereto. This might be a long process (but it has to start
anyhow). With a view to the solution it could be more efficient to
pull ourselves together and settle the problems here, on the
Balkans, rather than in Brussels or Dayton. 
It should be possible to apply some political techniques to
overcome the distrust and the neglect, as well as to learn more
about the common Balkan interests. The conflict solving theory
would be able to propose many concrete steps to set this process
in action. The national egoism can be easily transformed into a
Balkan one, because the illusion we could save ourselves individ-
ually, is of the most dangerous ones. 
The more we try to believe we are “European” and continue
to neglect our Balkan identity, the more the others will think about
us as “Balkan”. But as far as “Balkan” means something odd and
negative (no matter if true or not), it would be very hard for us to
wipe out that image. And if we are only ashamed and trying “to
get away”, how could others be supposed to accept us? 
Unfortunately the political elites of the Balkan countries are
not ready yet to lead their peoples towards such a goal. 
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If it is possible to disentangle “the Balkan puzzle”, we might
do it by ourselves. To reject “the help” of the Great Powers would
be good enough to start. 
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